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DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT
CIVIL LIBERTIES. By Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill New York:
Russell Sage Foundation. 1983. Pp. x, 512. $29.95.
Facts are ventriloquists' dummies. Sitting on a wise man's knee they may
be made to utter words of wisdom; elsewhere, they say nothing, or talk
nonsense. 1

In Dimensions of Tolerance Herbert McClosky2 and Alida Brill3
present data about community attitudes toward civil liberties. The
data are drawn from questionnaires the authors distributed to several
thousand adult Americans eliciting the respondent's beliefs regarding
freedom and tolerance. The findings are interesting, but the analysis is
inadequate. The data presented in Dimensions of Tolerance deserve a
more thoughtful and scholarly treatment than they receive in this
book.
Dimensions of Tolerance begins with a discussion of liberty - "a
frail and tenuous reed, slow to take root, rare, and often short-lived"
(p. 13). Liberty, we are told, must be balanced continually against the
need for control, and total freedom is not invariably a social good.
The authors' stated goal is to discover the influences which "prompt
some men and women to honor and protect civil liberties, while others
give priority to obedience and conformity" (p. 4).
Quick1y, however, a bias appears. To the authors, "silencing revolutionaries and extremists violates a fundamental principle of freedom,
since freedom depends on a mutual obligation to grant to others what
one claims for oneself" (p. 16). The problem, as the authors see it, is
how to persuade "political or religious zealots that their own liberty,
and that of the nation itself, is jeopardized by denying liberty to others
. [o]r that politics and civility depend upon mutual obligations
. . ." (p. 17).
These statements suggest that society opts either for freedom or for
control, and the bulk of Dimensions of Tolerance examines why some
people do not opt for freedom. But this dichotomy is simplistic.
"Speech advocating violent overthrow . . . ," Robert Bork has written, is "not political speech because it violates constitutional truths
about processes and because it is not aimed at a new definition of political truth by a legislative majority." 4 It may be argued plausibly that
1. A. HUXLEY, nME Musr HAVE A STOP 301 (1944).
2. Herbert McClosky is well known as a critic and analyst of American politics and culture.
His landmark study, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 361
(1964), found that politically active and influential individuals are more likely to respect the civil
rights of minority groups and interests than are less politically active individuals. Id. at 373-74.
McClosky is currently Research Director at the Survey Research Center in Berkeley and professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.
3. Alida Brill is Program Director and Scholar in Residence at the Russell Sage Foundation.
4. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (1971).
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obscenity, libel, and the expression of totalitarian or racist sentiments
may be proscribed by a polity without liberty being trampled underfoot. 5 It is not meaningful to say on the one hand that freedom and
control must be balanced and then to assert (as the authors do) that
there is one libertarian norm to which all Americans should subscribe.
Nevertheless, the authors assume -implicitly that one viewpoint, which
sees tolerance as the preeminent value, is both "correct" and central to
the idea of American democracy. In fact, they label what they are
studying "The Learning of Civil Libertarian Norms" (p. 232). The
potential complexity of the authors' conclusions is thus hobbled by
their overly simplistic assumption as to the very nature of tolerance.
What Mcclosky and Brill provide are correlations. Ideology and
tolerance are correlated: conservatives are less libertarian than liberals. Age and tolerance are correlated: older people are less libertarian
than younger people. Psychological traits are also analyzed: misanthropic people are less tolerant than sympathetic people. Other factors are examined: educated people are more tolerant than the less
educated, and nonreligious people are more tolerant than those more
religious. The only possibly relevant factor that seems to have been
omitted is economic status. The amount of information assembled is
quite impressive, and will no doubt be of great use to other social theorists and scholars.
As the authors admit, however, to learn that one factor (e.g., age)
is correlated with opinions on tolerance does not prove that the factor
caused the correlation. Growing old, for example, does not necessarily
cause a shift away from libertarianism: "[a]ge may also reflect the
historical period or Zeitgeist through which an individual has lived,
the events of which have presumably affected and perhaps significantly
altered his or her attitudes . . ." (p. 398). All too often, the statistics
seem to lead nowhere. For example, although the mass public is likely
to support libertarian values in the abstract, it is less likely than community leaders or "elites" (people who occupy positions of influence
and power) to support those values when applied to specific situations.
While ninety percent of the people polled agreed with the statement,
"I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be"
(p. 50), when the question was whether a community should allow the
American Nazi party to use its town hall to hold a public meeting, a
much higher proportion of the mass public than of the community
elite answered in the negative (p. 53). The implications of these statistics are intriguing; from a civil libertarian standpoint, it might be preferable to discourage the mass electorate from participating in the
political process. On the other hand, it may be the process of political
involvement that creates tolerance. As another example, it is interest5. See generally Bollinger, The Slrokie Legacy: Reflections on an ''Easy Case" and Free
Speech Theory (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982).
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ing to learn that people who oppose abortion also tend to oppose pornography, sexual freedom, and homosexual rights (p. 334), but the
causes of these beliefs are still unexplored. Unfortunately, this book
does not - perhaps cannot - provide answers to many of the questions it raises. When the authors do reach conclusions, it often appears that they have failed to consider the complexities of the issues
with which they deal. Regarding abortion, they state:
[O]ne has reason to dou~t that most anti-abortionists are principally motivated by convictions about the "right to life." For example, 81 percent
of the anti-abortionists among the community leaders and 74 percent of
those in the general population support capital punishment. [P. 334.]

This correlation does not necessarily undercut the "right to life" justification. Attitudes toward life and death and law and order are not as
simple as the authors imply.
The authors' research also reveals some startling differences between the mass public and the "elite." The researchers asked, "[i]f a
news photographer takes pictures of a famous person entering a house
of prostitution, [should] publishing the photos . . . be permitted . . .
[or] forbidden as an invasion of privacy" (p. 62)? While a significant
majority of the legal elite and community leaders would allow publication, a nearly identical percentage of the mass public would forbid it.
McCloskey and Brill use these statistics to support their thesis that
community leaders and elites are more tolerant and more in accord
with current legal standards than is the general public (p. 64). What is
interesting, however, is that the question requires a choice between
two values - a free press versus the right of privacy - each of which
might be seen as libertarian. The statistic suggests that the general
public values the right to privacy more highly than do those more
knowledgeable about social "norms." If borne out by other evidence, 6
this might suggest that both the law and the community elite are behind, rather than ahead of, the general public in appreciating this libertarian value.
Another interesting statistic reveals that while only six percent of
the mass public believes that "[u]sing violence to achieve political
goals is sometimes the only way to get injustices corrected," eleven
percent of the community leaders and sixteen percent of the legal elite
agreed with the statement (p. 75). Fully one-quarter of the legal elite
declined to declare the use of violence always wrong. This may, in one
sense, show the increased "tolerance" of elites, but it may also indicate
6. This thesis is given some support by another statistic in Dimensions of Tolerance. Twentyeight percent of the mass public agreed with this statement:
When applying for a job, a person's prison record should be kept confidential since the exconvict deserves a chance to make a fresh start.
Only 19% of the co=unity leaders, and 14% of the legal elite, agreed with the statement. P.
194. These results could indicate a greater regard for privacy among the mass public than in the
other groups
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that the more experience people have with the legislative and judicial
processes of this country the less faith they have that those processes
work effectively. 7 As with other correlations in the book, the authors
merely begin the search for understanding.
Dimensions of Tolerance, then, is flawed, but it remains very useful.
The book's value lies not in its lengthy second-hand summaries of the
constitutional status of certain civil liberties in 1977, 8 or in its generalizations, which are of questionable validity. For example, the authors
refer to the "low level of political interest displayed by vast numbers of
the American people" (p. 418) although McClosky himself has previously refuted this common misconception. 9 The value of this book lies
in its wealth of useful and thought-provoking information. The statistics and correlations are there; the truly thoughtful and revealing conclusions remain to be drawn.

7. It is also worth noting that the sizable minority of lawyers who do not completely reject
the use of violence in the pursuit of justice is hard to reconcile with the authors' assertion elsewhere that "lawyers are more disposed than any other segment of the population to adjust their
beliefs to the rulings of the higher courts." P. 419. The higher state courts have not been hospitable to civil disobedience even when nonviolent. See, e.g., State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 47273, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973) (even nonviolent illegal behavior is unacceptable except under extremely unusual circumstances).
8. Chapters 2 through 5 of Dimensions of Tolerance summarize the results of the authors'
research in four discrete sections: "The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and Press"; "The
First Amendment: Symbolic Speech, Conduct, Assembly, and Religion"; "The Rights of Due
Process"; and ''The Rights of Privacy and Lifestyle." Each section begins with a summary of the
legal status of the right in question which McClosky and Brill based on memorandums prepared
for them in 1977. The summaries are outdated, oversimplified, and of use only to the lay reader.
9. McClosky wrote:
The few cross-national studies conducted so far indicate, however, that despite the low
[voter] turnout, other indexes of participation - political interest and awareness, expressed
party affiliation, sense of political competence, etc. - tend to be higher in the United States
than in many other countries, such as France and Italy.
Political Participation, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (D.
Sills ed. 1968).

